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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In the European Union (EU), the postal sector is now partially opened to 
competition, with full opening of all national markets foreseen for January 1, 
2009.  After 2009 competitors will be able to enter EU postal markets more 
or less freely and offer mail services to their customers in all segments of the 
postal value chain, both upstream (in worksharing and consolidation 
activities) and downstream (in delivery activities).  Entry into downstream 
services means that the incumbent postal operator will no longer be a 
monopolist in the delivery activity.  This is in sharp contrast with the U.S. 
situation where the historical operator remains a monopolist for final 
delivery.  
In a competitive postal market, the competitors of the incumbent operator 
have two options for mail delivery.  They can either build up their own 
delivery network (downstream bypass) or they can use the delivery 
network of the incumbent postal operator (downstream access).  Different 
costs are associated with these two options.  If the operator chooses 
downstream bypass, its delivery cost is a network cost while if it chooses 
downstream access, its delivery cost is the access price paid to the 
incumbent operator.  This choice between access and bypass is a standard 
make-or-buy choice for mail distribution. 
In the European countries that already experience full market 
liberalization, both types of delivery strategies are observed.  In Sweden, the 
monopoly position of Sweden Post was abolished in 1993.  Since then, the 
main competitor of Sweden Post has been CityMail.  CityMail chooses the 
downstream bypass option and delivers mails with its own delivery network.  
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However, CityMail still has limited geographical coverage.  The business 
model of CityMail is original.  The firm concentrates on the delivery of pre-
sorted bulk mails and delivers mails twice a week at predetermined dates.  
By doing so, CityMail has a very flexible cost structure with almost no 
collection and sorting costs.  So far, the market share of CityMail represents 
7.5 per cent of the total mail volume, but it reaches a higher market share 
(around 25 per cent) for the bulk mail market (Jonsson and Selander, 2006).  
Sandd operates on a similar business model in The Netherlands.  The 
company now covers the whole territory and delivers direct mails twice a 
week.  In 2005, Sandd has a market share of 8.5 per cent and plans future 
growth.  
In 2005, 16 companies have received a license to operate postal services 
in the UK. Most of these new companies offer E2E mail services but the 
mails they collect are ultimately delivered by the incumbent operator, Royal 
Mail (downstream access).  For the moment, around 7-8 per cent of the mails 
delivered by Royal Mail are pre-sorted by competitors and posted at access 
points and the importance of this type of mail is expected to grow.  An 
originality of the access pricing system in the UK is the existence of a non-
uniform access tariff (Hill and Robinson, 2006).  The territory is divided into 
five delivery zones according to delivery point density1 which is the main 
driver of delivery costs. The access price for a given mailing is set according 
to its delivery zone.  There are significant price variations across zones: the 
access prices range from £0.111 to £0.215 with a mean price of £0.13.  Non-
uniform access pricing can be seen as an attempt to limit the possibilities of 
downstream bypass in the most profitable--high density–delivery regions.  
By setting a price below the average for the delivery in the high-density 
regions, Royal Mail lowers the incentives to bypass its delivery network.  
In this article, we are interested in the determinants of the access vs. 
bypass choice by a new postal operator and the consequences of this choice 
in term of welfare. We particularly concentrate on the influence of the 
incumbent prices–stamp and access prices–on the choice of a delivery 
technology by the entrant.  The starting point of our analysis is the 
computation of the welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator.  
These efficient prices are standard Ramsey prices (see Laffont and Tirole, 
1994, 2000 for general principles and Crew and Kleindorfer, 1992; Billette 
de Villemeur et al., 2005; De Donder, 2006 for applications to the postal 
sector).  Ramsey prices include a mark-up above marginal costs to finance 
the universal services obligations (USO) imposed on the incumbent.  We 
                                                     
1 Defined for each postcode as the total surface area divided by the number of delivery 
points.   
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show that this type of USO financing distorts the access vs. bypass decision 
of the entrant.  In particular, there is excessive bypass if Ramsey prices are 
applied.   
However, modifying the access price modifies the incentives to bypass 
and the regulator can depart from Ramsey prices to induce the desired 
amount of bypass.  To determine the appropriate modifications to Ramsey 
prices, we integrate, as a constraint, the delivery choice of the entrant in the 
derivation of welfare maximizing prices.  At these modified Ramsey prices, 
the access charge is lower and excessive bypass is partially corrected.  But, 
inducing an efficient delivery choice is costly in terms of welfare.   
The second part of our analysis concentrates on the influence of access 
price on the type of entry (access vs. bypass) and on the timing of entry in a 
dynamic context.  The postal sector is ahead of many changes: full market 
liberalization, reform of the USO, decline in mail volumes, and growing 
importance of bulk mail, to name a few.  Considering this changing 
environment, the entrant has numerous entry strategies, immediate or 
delayed entry (to full market opening) with either access or bypass.  The 
entrant has also the possibility of entering the market without a delivery 
network and later switching to bypass.  Access price affects these strategic 
choices of entry.  We show that a lower access price induces earlier entry 
with access.  Moreover, if the entrant has scale economies in its delivery 
activity and if the demand faced by the entrant is growing, a lower access 
price induces a later switch to bypass.  Eventually, the incumbent can always 
prevent bypass with sufficiently low access prices.   
 
2.   THE CHOICE BETWEEN ACCESS AND BYPASS IN A STATIC 
CONTEXT  
 
Our static model is similar to De Donder (2006) except that we do not 
distinguish two delivery regions with different delivery costs.  We consider a 
market where two postal firms, an incumbent operator (I) and a new entrant 
(E), offer end-to-end (E2E) mail services to consumers.  We denote by pI 
and pE the stamp prices charged by I and E for this service.  In addition to its 
E2E mail product, the incumbent operator offers a second product: access to 
its delivery network.  Access (or worksharing) is available to both 
consumers and the entrant at the same price of a.  This restriction can be 
viewed as an application of the non-discrimination principle imposed by the 
European Directives.2   
                                                     
2 The preamble of the second postal directive (2002/39/EC) states that “The universal service 
providers normally provide services, for example to business customers, consolidators of mail 
for different customers and bulk mailers, enabling them to enter the mail stream at different 
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To buy access, the consumers and the entrant must pre-sort their mails 
and transport them to an access point.  The consumers can perform these 
operations at a unit cost of k.  The price for consumer direct access (CDA) is 
the sum of the consumer’s upstream cost k and the access price: pD = a+k.   
The three products are imperfect substitutes.  The incumbent delivers 
mail 5 or 6 days a week and the entrant offers a J+3 mail product.  If E 
chooses the bypass options, it delivers mails twice a week.  With the access 
option, the entrant deposits mails at an access point two days after collection.  
The characteristics of the entrant’s mail product are not affected by the 
delivery method.  This means, in particular, that the entrant can achieve the 
same reliability in delivery as the incumbent.   
The surplus of a representative consumer who posts mail volumes qI with 
the incumbent, qE with the entrant and qD at access points is: 
V (qI ,qE ,qD ) − pI qI − pEqE − pDqD  
From this consumer surplus, we can derive demand functions.  For 
product K = I, E, D, the inverse demand is given by:  
pK (qI ,qE ,qD ) =∂V (q
I ,qE ,qD )
∂qK  
There are two types of costs associated with the E2E mail products: an 
upstream cost (cost of collection, transport and sorting) and a downstream 
(or delivery) cost.  We denote by cJ and dJ the unit cost of upstream and 
downstream operations for the incumbent (J = I) and the entrant (J = E).   
Universal service obligations (USO) are imposed on the incumbent 
operator. USO may include the requirement to serve all customers 
(universality/ubiquity), the imposition of a geographically uniform tariff for 
a bundle of products, obligations in term of service quality (frequency of 
delivery, accessibility of contact points) and constraints on prices. It is 
commonly accepted (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2006 for example) that 
universal service obligations are associated with large fixed costs for the 
universal service provider (USP).  We denote these fixed costs by F.  
Firm E has the choice between two delivery methods: it can either build 
up its own delivery network–which has a cost dE per mail delivered–or it can 
perform only the upstream activities and buy access from the incumbent.  
                                                                                                                            
points and under different conditions by comparison with the standard letters service. In 
doing this, the universal service providers should comply with the principles of transparency 
and non-discrimination, both as between different third parties and as between third parties 
and universal service providers supplying equivalent services. It is also necessary for such 
services to be available to private customers who post in similar conditions, given the need 
for non-discrimination in the provision of services.” 
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Because the entrant’ product has the same quality with the two delivery 
methods, this choice is a make-or-buy choice and the entrant chooses the 
cheapest option.  Firm E then chooses access if a < dE and bypass otherwise.  
In the sequel, we denote by z the total demand for access; thus, z is equal to 
qD under bypass and to qD+qE under access.   
Firm E acts as a competitive fringe and sets its stamp price at marginal 
cost.  Then we have: 
 
pE = a+cE If E chooses access, 
pE = dE +cE If E chooses bypass. 
 
The incumbent operator is regulated and the regulator fixes the 
incumbent’s prices in order to maximize the total surplus (consumer surplus 
+ firms’ profits) subject to a non-negative profit constraint for the 
incumbent.3   The regulator determines the welfare maximizing prices by 
solving the following problem:  
Max
a, pI
 W(θ ) ≡V (qI ,qE ,qD ) − (c I + d I )qI − (cE +θd E + (1 −θ )d I )qE
                    − (k + d I )qD − F
 
Subject to: 
ΠI (θ ) = (pI − c I − d I )qI + (1 −θ )(a − d I )qE + (a − d I )qD − F ≥ 0 
pE = cE +θd E + (1 −θ )a  
pD = a + k  
where θ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrant chooses to bypass and 
to 0 if it chooses access.. 
 
2.2 Welfare maximizing prices 
 
This welfare maximization program gives Ramsey prices for access and 
letters.  The computation of these prices is standard (see Laffont and Tirole, 
2000).  They can be expressed as: 




+ (a (θ ) − d I )σ1(θ )  
                                                     
3 Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003) show that welfare maximizing prices can be 
decentralized by imposing an appropriate global price cap on the incumbent. 
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a (θ ) = d I + λ
1+ λ
a (θ )
θηD + (1 −θ )ηZ
+ (pI (θ ) − c I − d I )σ 2 (θ ) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the zero profit constraint 
for firm I, ηK, (K=I, D, Z) are the absolute values of elasticity of product K 
and σ1(θ), σ2(θ) are the displacement ratios that measures the substitutability 
between products:   
σ1(θ ) = − dq
D /dpI + (1 −θ )dqE /dpI
dqI /dpI
 and 
σ 2 (θ ) = − dq
I /da
dqD /da + (1 −θ )dqE /da .  
The welfare-maximizing prices can be expressed as the sum of three 
terms: the marginal cost of the product plus a Ramsey term inversely related 
to the product elasticity, plus a displacement term.  These last two terms 
constitute a mark-up above the marginal cost and the incumbent covers the 
fixed cost F with this mark-up.  The Ramsey term means that the product for 
which the demand is highly sensitive to price is charged a lower contribution 
to the USO financing than a less price elastic product.  The third term is a 
displacement term.  The ratios σ measure the displacement between access 
and E2E mails.  A value of σ1 equals to 1 means that each additional E2E 
letter sent displaces one letter sent previously through access (either by the 
entrant or by the consumer).  The presence of this term implies that the 
incumbent is compensated for the lost profit due to a lost of mail volume.  
Note that in the above formulas, the access price is equivalent to the 
ECPR(Armstrong, 2001) when λ = 0 and σ = 1. 
There are two differences between prices under access and bypass.  First, 
the displacement ratios are different.  Under access, there is no compensation 
for consumers switching from CDA to firm E because there is no lost in 
access receipts. Second, because the incumbent looses access receipts (a-
dI)qE,  the overall level of price increases.  This is captured by a change in 
the Lagrange multiplier.   
 
2.2 Access vs. bypass 
 
2.2.1 Welfare maximizing delivery method 
 
We can associate to the efficient prices under bypass and access welfare 
levels W(1) and W(0).  The comparison between both gives the following 
result: 
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Result 1: (i) There exists a cut-off level ˜ d E for the entrant’s delivery cost 
such that access is preferred for dE > ˜ d E and bypass is preferred for dE 
< ˜ d E.  (ii) ˜ d E< a(0).    
 
The intuition behind this result is simple.4  First, the welfare under 
bypass W(1) decreases with the delivery cost of the entrant: a less efficient 
competitor reduces welfare.  Second, the welfare under access is 
independent of the delivery cost dE.  Thus, there exists a cut-off level for the 
delivery cost such that W(1) = W(0).  This means therefore that below that 
cut-off point, the benefit of a more cost-effective competitor more than 
compensates for the fact that, with bypass, the entrant does not contribute to 
USO financing.  We can show that this cut-off value is below the access 
price.  For a delivery cost dE equal to the access price, the letter price of the 
entrant is the same with the two delivery methods, but only in the access 
case does the entrant contributes to USO financing.  Therefore at that point, 
we have W(0) > W(1).  By continuity of the welfare functions, the cut-off 
point is smaller than the access price.  
 
2.2.2 Choice of a delivery method by the entrant 
 
But, the entrant does not base is access vs. bypass decision on the cut-off 
value ˜ d E but, rather, on the relative prices of the two delivery technologies.  
A competitive entrant chooses access if dE ≥ a(0) and bypass otherwise.  The 
consequence is excessive bypass by the entrant if the regulator applies the 
welfare maximizing prices.  In other words, the entrant does not always 
choose the welfare maximizing delivery technology and bypasses too often.   
 
Result  2:  For dE ∈[ ˜ d E, a(0)], the entrant bypasses while access is socially 
efficient .      
 
Efficient access prices are associated with an excessive amount of 
bypass.  The consequences on welfare are illustrated in figure 1.  For a 
delivery cost dE in the interval [ ˜ d E, a(0)], welfare is higher with access but 
this welfare level is not achievable because the entrant chooses to bypass.  
 
 
                                                     
4 For a formal proof see Bloch and Gautier (2006). 
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Figure 1: Excessive Bypass at the Efficient Prices 
Welfare 
Delivery cost 






Access is preferred but E chooses Bypass 
Bypass is preferred 
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2.3 Constrained Access 
 
Welfare is reduced because of the noted mismatch between the efficient 
delivery method and the choice of the entrant.  But, the regulator can use 
prices to modify the choice of the entrant.  In particular, lowering the access 
price below a(0) modifies the delivery technology adopted by the entrant.  
We then compute a constrained access solution where the regulator’s 
objective is welfare maximization with the additional constraint that the 
entrant does not choose the bypass option.  For that, the access price must 
not be larger than the delivery cost of the entrant.  In this constrained 
problem, the solution is to set the access price equal to dE when dE is smaller 
than a(0).   
But lowering the access price below its efficient level to prevent 
excessive bypass has a cost.  Access receipts decline and, to finance the 
USO, the regulator must increase the stamp price of the incumbent’s letter.  
With this constrained access solution, the financial burden of the USO is 
mainly supported by the customers that do not have the possibility to pre-
sort their mail and buy direct access nor the possibility to switch to an 
alternative provider.  Clearly households will be charged a higher stamp 
price if the regulator wishes to prevent inefficient bypass by the entrant.5  
Moreover, preventing bypass is more costly in welfare terms when the 
entrant has a relatively more efficient delivery technology.   
We can show that preventing bypass is not desirable in all circumstances.  
In other words, the regulator should continue to allow a certain amount of 
excessive bypass.  The reason is that a) W(1) decreases in dE, b) the welfare 
level under constrained access increases in dE and c) setting a = dE reduces 
welfare compared to W(0).  The following result is derived from these three 
facts. 
 
Result 3: (i) There exists a cut-off point d* such that welfare with 
constrained access (a=dE) equals W(1).  (ii)  d* ≥ ˜ d E .   
 
This result implies that the required modifications in prices to achieve the 
socially efficient delivery method may be too costly in term of welfare.  
Therefore, the excessive bypass result continues to hold even if the regulator 
reduces its importance.   
                                                     
5 De Donder et al. (2006) and Panzar (2005) consider that the minimization of the letter price 
could be an objective for the regulator.   
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Figure 2 illustrates the welfare levels that the regulator can achieve when 
it takes into account the impact of prices on the entrant’s access vs. bypass 
decision.  
As it is illustrated in the figure and in the numerical example developed 
hereafter, it is when the two firms have similar delivery cost that most of the 
welfare losses occur.  The reason is that, for similar delivery costs, there is a 
mismatch between the choice of the entrant and the socially efficient choice.  
Conversely, if the two firms have dissimilar costs there is no mismatch of 
this kind.  If the entrant is a lot more cost effective than the entrant, welfare 
is maximized with bypass and the entrant effectively chooses that option.  
When the entrant is a lot less cost effective, it prefers access and that option 
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2.4 A numerical example 
 
We calibrate a linear demand model to illustrate our results.  The 
parameters of the demand function are chosen to have mailing volumes of xI 
= 1 billion, xD = 0.5 billion and xE = 0.2 billion at the efficient prices under 
access.  In this scenario, the incumbent has a delivery cost of 0.2€, an 
upstream cost of 0.1€ and the total cost of the USO is 0.3 billion €.  The 
entrant has a 20 per cent lower upstream cost and we consider three cases for 
the entrant’s delivery cost: a) dE = 0.4 (twice the unit cost of the incumbent), 
b) dE = 0.25 (25 per cent higher than  dI) and c) dE = 0.15 (25 per cent lower 
than dI).    
Table 1 contains the results of this calibration exercise.  The prices 
charged by the incumbent are calculated to maximize the welfare.  Consider 
first case a) where the entrant’s delivery cost is 0.4€.  Clearly at that cost, 
access is the preferred solution.  Note that under bypass the access price a(1) 
is too low and it induces the firm to choose access.  Therefore, the bypass 
scenario is feasible only if a increases up to 0.4€ causing further losses in 
welfare.   
In case b) with a delivery cost dE = 0.25, the efficient access price a(0) = 
0.36 does not induce access.  Therefore, to prevent bypass, the regulator 
must apply a constrained access solution where the access price is equal to 
the entrant’s delivery cost.  This 0.11€ decrease in the access price reduces 
the access receipts and, to compensate, the letter price increases.  But, even 
with this fall in access receipts, welfare is higher under access than under 
bypass, though the welfare levels are very close.   
Finally, in case c) when dE = 0.15, if the constrained access solution 
applies, the incumbent looses 0.05€ per access mail.  Therefore, the price pI 
must increase even more to finance the 0.3 billion € USO fixed cost.   In this 
case, welfare is higher under bypass but the welfare gains compared to the 
unconstrained access solution are extremely small.   
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Table 1: Calibration Results 
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Welfare 1.554 1.501 1.530 1.524 1.423 1.547 
Welfare (indices) 100 96 98 98 91 99 
1 The regulator must apply the constrained access solution 
 
In our example, we assumed that the incumbent continues to have some 
reserved area since, even with a large cost advantage, the entrant has at most 
a market share close to 25 per cent.  In this context, the highest possible 
welfare is achieved with access or with bypass if the cost advantage of the 
entrant in the delivery activity is more than 25 per cent.  However, there are 
constraints that limit what could be actually implemented.  When the 
entrant’s cost is below a(0) = 0.36, the access solution is no longer possible 
since at that price the entrant chooses to bypass.  Then, the constrained 
access solution must be applied and this causes a decrease in the welfare.  
When this solution is compared with bypass, it appears that bypass is 
preferred whenever the entrant’s cost is lower or equal to 0.24€.  So, even if 
the entrant is less efficient in the delivery activity, bypass is preferred, 
because inducing access is too costly.   
To conclude, the first part of the analysis, we can say that welfare-
maximizing prices do not necessarily induce an efficient choice of a delivery 
method by the entrant.  Thus, the regulator must take into account the impact 
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of prices on the induced choice of a delivery method and modify the prices 
appropriately.  If the regulator wishes to favor access rather than bypass, the 
access price must be lowered compared to its optimal level and the price of 
E2E mail must increase to cover the incumbent’s fixed cost.  This results in 
the entrant’s having a higher market share in the E2E mail market.   
 
3.   THE CHOICE BETWEEN ACCESS AND BYPASS IN 
A DYNAMIC CONTEXT 
 
In the previous section, we developed a formal model of the postal sector 
where access price influences the delivery method of the entrant.  In this 
section, we perform a similar exercise in a dynamic context.  We concentrate 
on two questions: (a) what is the influence of the access price on the timing 
of entry by new competitors?  And (b) what is the influence of the access 
price on the delivery technology of the entrant?  We particularly concentrate 
on the conditions that guarantee that an access-to-bypass equilibrium exists 
in the postal sector.  That is, an equilibrium where a new postal operator 
starts its business by buying access from the incumbent and later switches to 
bypass.   
The postal market is ahead of many changes.  First, by the end of 2006, 
the third postal directive will decide whether or not full market liberalization 
will be imposed on Member States in 2009.  Second, e-substitution has an 
impact on the short and medium term demand for mail (Trinkner and 
Grossmann, 2006).  Therefore, economic activity (or GDP) is no longer a 
strong determinant of mail demand and some postal operators already face a 
decline in mail volumes.  Third, despite a slow growing (or declining) total 
demand, there are new opportunities for development in the bulk mail 
market segment.  Since the entrant mainly targets this segment, the 
consequence of these joint evolutions is that a newcomer potentially faces a 
growing demand for its products, especially if full market liberalization is 
decided for 2009.  
The evolution of the environment has an impact on the choice of a 
delivery method by the entrant and it is the focus of this section.  Before, we 
briefly review the dynamics of entry in other network industries  
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3.1 Dynamic of entry in network industries 
 
In the context of telecommunication, Bourreau and Dogan (2005) 
develop a dynamic model of technology adoption.  In their model, the 
incumbent operator decides first whether or not to provide access to its local 
loop.  If it does so, it sets a rental price.  Then, at each period t, the 
competitor has two options: it can either lease the local loop of the 
incumbent operator and compete for the provision of telecommunication 
services or it can build up its own infrastructure and the firms are then 
engaged in facility-based competition.  The first option is, of course, 
available only if the incumbent operator has decided to lease its local loop.  
The model has two key features: first, the new infrastructure is more 
efficient than the incumbent’s older one.  Second, the cost of the investment 
declines over time.  The main result is that by giving access and by setting a 
too low rental price for the local loop, the incumbent operator can delay the 
investment of its competitor and the technology is adopted too late from a 
welfare point of view.  The reason is that at each period the competitor 
compares the value of the two options.  Hence, a low rental price increases 
the value of the access option and causes a delay in the adoption of the new 
technology.   
Hori and Mizuno (2006) consider a dynamic model in which there is no 
existing network facility.  They consider an environment with a 
stochastically growing demand.  In this context, a monopolist would delay 
the infrastructure building until demand is sufficiently high to cover 
investment costs.  In a duopoly, the firms have incentives to invest earlier 
and pre-empt the market to become a leader.  But, once a leader has entered 
the market, the follower can either bypass and compete with its network 
facility or buy access to the leader’s network.  In their model, under some 
circumstances, an access-to-bypass equilibrium exists, that is an equilibrium 
in which the follower buys access before building up its own network 
facility.   
What is the impact of the access price on the access-to-bypass 
equilibrium?  The authors show that a decrease in the access charge induces 
three changes in the timing of technology adoption.  First, the leader invests 
later, second the follower enters the market earlier and finally, the follower 
bypasses later.  The second and third points are explained by the fact that a 
decrease in the access price makes the access profit larger and, therefore, it 
increases the incentives to enter the market and decreases the incentives to 
bypass.  At the limit, bypass never occurs if the access price is low enough.  
There are two reasons that explain why the leader invests later following a 
decrease in the access price: it has lower access receipts and, since the 
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follower enters earlier with access, it enjoys monopoly profits for a shorter 
time period.  
 
3.2 Dynamic of entry in the postal sector 
 
We will consider a situation similar to Hori and Mizuno (2006) where the 
mail demand faced by the entrant is growing over time.  Thus, with a given 
price differential, the market share of the entrant increases over time. At 
each period t, the entrant has three options: no entry, access and bypass.  
Unlike the previous section, we consider that the entrant has market power 
and realizes a positive profit as a result.  To each of these three options, we 
can associate a discounted profit flow: Π(0, t, a) for access, Π(1, t) for 
bypass and 0 for no entry. At each period t, the entrant chooses the option 
with the highest discounted profit flow.  With a growing demand, both Π(0, 
t, a) and Π(1, t) are increasing with t.  Under bypass, the profits are 
independent of the access price.  Under access, the per-period profit and the 
profit flow both decrease with a.   
In the postal context, entry with access is immediate (at period 0) if there 
is no entry cost and if the upstream operations are performed under constant 
return to scale.  Otherwise, entry could be delayed to the period t* where 
Π(0, t*, a) - φ = 0 where φ is the entry cost.  Entry is delayed up to the period 
where the demand is high enough to cover the entry cost.  It is then obvious 
that a lower access price increases the profit flow Π(0, t, a) and favors earlier 
entry.   
With constant return to scale in the delivery activity, our key findings of 
section 2 continue to apply.  In this case, if a lower delivery cost increases 
the profit flow, the entrant chooses the cheapest delivery method.  Then, if 
dE < a, the firm is active from period t*, defined as Π(1, t*) - φ=0, and the 
firm always bypass.  Clearly, lowering a below dE implies i) earlier entry and 
ii) that the entrant chooses the access option.  But, with constant return to 
scale in the delivery activity, depending on a and dE, the entrant chooses 
either access or bypass and there is no possible switch from one to the other.  
This reasoning is no longer true if the per-unit delivery cost of the entrant 
declines with the mail volumes.  With scales economies in the delivery 
activity, bypass is unprofitable when the demand is too low.  It becomes 
profitable only when the demand faced by the entrant is sufficiently large.  
Therefore in this case, there exists a cut-off period t**, defined as Π(1, t**) = 
0, at which bypass starts to become profitable.  Does it mean that the entrant 
starts to bypass at t**? The answer is negative because if at that period Π(0, 
t**, a) > 0, the entrant will continue to use the incumbent network to deliver 
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mails.  The entrant switches to bypass only if it manages to realize future 
economies of scale i.e. at a period t > t**.        
There could exist an access-to-bypass equilibrium in the postal sector 
only if i) the demand is growing and ii) the entrant has scale economies in 
the delivery activity.  In this case, the delivery decision differs from the 
static case and a switch from one technology to another must be considered.  
But, as in Bourreau and Dogan (2005) and Hori and Mizuno (2006), a low 
access price delays and eventually prevents the switch from access to 
bypass.     
The existence of switching costs could reverse the previous argument.  
When customers have brand loyalty, the profit flow with the bypass option 
depends on i) the period t through the growing demand and scale economies 
assumptions and ii) the number of consumers in the previous period.  In this 
case, lowering the access price increases the market share of an entrant that 
chooses the access option.  It therefore increases the profit flow with access 
but also the profit flow with bypass since a larger base of consumers reduces 
the per-unit delivery cost.  The existence of switching cost thus increases the 
value of the bypass option.  Therefore, a low access price can accelerate the 
switch from access to bypass because it allows the entrant to achieve a 
sufficient mail volume earlier.   
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have shown that access price to the postal delivery 
network plays an important role on the choice of a delivery technology by 
the entrant.  By contrast with most of the previous work on access pricing, 
we do not consider as given the delivery method of the entrant.  In a static 
context, we have shown that the efficient access price induces too much 
bypass, which is not without consequences on welfare.  This excessive 
bypass can be partially prevented by lowering the access price and 
simultaneously increasing the letter price.  Of course, there are limitations 
and welfare consequences of these policy responses as well, and we have 
provided some results on these consequences. 
These results show that efficient access prices do not create problems 
when the entrant is either much more or much less efficient in the delivery 
activity than the incumbent.  When the entrant is sufficiently less efficient, it 
buys access and firms compete only in the upstream segments of the market.  
If the entrant is more efficient, it chooses the bypass option and this ‘facility-
based’ competition enhances welfare.  Efficient access prices are 
problematic when the incumbent and the entrant have similar delivery costs.  
The maximization of welfare requires a mark-up above the marginal cost for 
the access price and no-bypass by the entrant.  Both firms then contribute to 
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the USO financing.  But, because the entrant does not contribute to the USO 
if it bypasses, this option is relatively cheaper than access even if the 
entrant’s delivery cost is higher.  Therefore, the access price should be 
lowered to induce the entrant to choose the access option.  As a result, the 
financial burden of the USO is mainly financed by the customers that send 
E2E letters with the incumbent.  By contrast, the contribution of the 
customers that pre-sort their mails and those who switch to the entrant is 
lower.6  
In a dynamic context, we observe a switch from access to bypass by the 
entrant if the demand faced by the entrant is growing and, if there are scale 
economies in the delivery activity.  While economies of scale in delivery are 
commonly accepted for the incumbent who must deliver mail 5 or 6 times a 
week as part of the USO, such economies of scale are less obvious for the 
entrant.  For example, De Donder (2006) assumes that the entrant operates 
under constant return to scale.  It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss the consequences of the existence of scale economies for the entrant.  
We just note that without such scale economies, the entrant’s delivery 
technology will not change over time.  Of course, scale economies per se do 
not guarantee a switch to bypass because the regulator (or the incumbent) 
can set a sufficiently low access price to preclude that move.    
In this paper, we used a simplified model to show the influence of prices 
on delivery choices and the consequences on welfare.  By doing so we 
neglected important dimensions that are worth being investigated.  In 
particular, if the regulator prevents bypass with appropriate prices, the 
incumbent remains de facto a monopolist for the delivery activity.  The 
absence of competition in delivery does not provide incentives to engage in 
cost-reducing activities in delivery.  Conversely, bypass could stimulate the 
incumbent to lower the costs of delivery and, as in other network industries, 
facility-based competition can further promote innovative and cost-saving 
practices in the downstream activity.  Clearly, we have neglected these 
effects in our welfare analysis.  Likewise, we did not investigate the welfare 
consequences of other types of competition like the entrant providing 
downstream access to customers or the incumbent sub-contracting delivery 
to a more cost effective entrant.  Panzar (2005) shows that the first type of 
competition hurts welfare while the other is not in conflict with the pursuit 
of public policies objectives.  Integrating these new dimensions within the 
present analytic framework could yield a number of promising avenues for 
future research.   
 
                                                     
6 Panzar (2005) suggests that the minimization of the incumbent’s letter price can be an 
appropriate objective for the regulator.  Clearly in our model, this objective is not met when 
the regulator must lower the access price to prevent an inefficient bypass. 
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